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Summary:
Deforestation is a global environmental concern, but the underlying processes vary across regions
and countries. In Pakistan the threat to forests and biodiversity does not come primarily from local
farmers, but from unsustainable commercIal logging. Employing an actor-oriented approach, the
paper focuses on private timber merchants (forest contractors) acting as intermediaries between the
provincial bureaucracy and local forest owners. Loopholes in the forest legislation, combined with
weakesses in the organization of forest harvesting, have enabled contractors to prosper. Forest
contractors have detailed knowledge of weaknesses in the forest legislation and know the
sentiments, needs and demands of local people. By combining such insights contractors turn their
middleman position into a profitable enterprise, thereby contributing to increased pressure on
remaining forest resources.
Sammendrag:
Avskogning er et globalt miljøproblem, men de underliggende prosessene varierer mellom ulike
regioner. I Pakistan er det kommersiell tømmerhogst og ikke lokale bønder som representerer den
største trusselen mot skog og biodiversitet. Dette notatet fokuserer på skogkontraktører som
mellommenn i Pakistans skogforvaltning. Svakheter i skoglovgivningen gjør det mulig for private
tømmerhandlere (skogkontraktører) å etablere seg mellom lokale skogeiere og provinsbyråkratiet.
Analytisk kan skogkontraktører karakteriseres som rurale entreprenører. De har detaljert kunnskap
om skoglovgivningen og kjenner krav og ønsker fra de lokale skogeierne. Ved å kombinere denne
innsikten skaffer kontraktører seg økonomisk gevinst og bidrar til økt press på de gjenværende
skogressursene.
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Introduction
This paper analyzes the social and institutional factors behind the high logging
pressure and deforestation in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of
Pakistan (Figure 1). Forest management may at first appear as a dull subject, one
best left to specialists such as foresters and, possibly, historians. Over the past
decades, however, there has been a shift from viewing forestry as primarily a
technical exercise, to emphasize the social context of forestry as well as its
embeddedness in institutional and political fields of larger scale. People who live
among the forests hold the key to their conservation, but as this paper should
demonstrate, the conservation of forests is not on ly dependent on local
management practices but influenced by forest polícies, various stakeholders and
market demand.
The NWFP holds about 30 per cent of Pakistan's remaining five per cent forest
cover (Jan 1993:2; NCS 1992:175). Most of the coniferous forests in the province
are found in the Malakand and Hazara Divisions.l About 88 per cent of the
forests being commercially exploited in the NWFP are under some form of private
ownership. It has been estimated that if the present rate of deforestation continues,
the remaining fores t wil disappear within the next 30 years. Gaining a better
understanding of the dynamics of deforestation in private forests is urgent and
holds the key to understand deforestation in the prov in c e as a whole.
While the prime focus is here on the causes of contemporary deforestation,2
it is evident that present day practices are embedded in the environment al history
of the South Asian continent. As such the 'major factors in the depletion of the
Himalayan forests..(are)..essentially a historical question' (Tucker 1987:328). In
order to understand the process of deforestation in the NWFP, there is a need to
combine an understanding of current management practices with a diachronic view
of the underlying factors which have shaped them. The rationale behind forest
management must be sought in the interface between the economic payoffs to
different stakeholders and the legal and institutional framework of forest
management. This paper argues that shifting forest policies, bureaucratic reforms,
market demand for timber and rural poverty exposed the private forests in the
NWFP to damaging logging pressure. Central actors in this process were local
middlemen, the forest contractors (tekhedars), who took advantage of the
unplanned implications of federal forest policies. In order to understand how this
process unfolded we have to return - quite appropriately - to its roots, namely
British colonial forest policies in the 19th century .
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which make up about one-third of the
NWFP, have substantial forest resources but are not considered due to lack of adequate data
(but see, Khan et aL. 1993).
2 As Hamilton (1988:8) has remarked it is a problem that 'the generic term "deforestation" is
used so ambiguously that it is virtually meaningless as a description of land-use change'.
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Forest management in British India
Deforestation is a problem throughout the hily and mountainous areas of South
Asia and its origins can be traced to early colonial forest polices affecting most
of the Western Himalayas (Tucker 1982). Early 19th century forest exploitation
in British India focused on 'hardwoods', in particular sal (Shorea robusta). Later
when the hardwoods had become depleted, the interest turne d to 'softwoods',
primarily Himalayan cedar (Cedrus deodara) which was used for railway sleepers.
The commercial exploitation under British administration was already in the 1850s
so high that doubts were raised about its sustainability (Tucker 1982: 1 16) and the
period 1850- 1 860 has been terme d 'the first period of massive deforestation in the
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Himalayas' (Tucker 1987:329). The first forest laws were promulgated in 1878,
and the Indian Forest Law introduced two main legal categories; 'Reserved
Forests' and 'Protected Forests' (Tucker 1982: L 17). Reserved Forests were set
aside to be managed by the newly created Forest Department. The Protected Forest
category was instituted to give temporary shelter to forests until management plans
could be worked out. The prime motive for demarcating the Reserved Forests was
to safeguard valuable timber, especia.lly Himalayan cedar, for the needs of the
state. Thus, 'the Forest Department spent the next half century demarcating the
Reserved Forests in which they worked with private contractors to harvest timber
for dis tant markets' (Tucker 1987:329). After the state had demarcated the
Reserved Forests, selected areas were set aside to ful fil the subsistence needs of
local communities. Originally known as 'public wastelands', they were later
termed Guzara Forests (Azhar 1989, 1993). Demarcation of the first Guzara
Forests began in 1882 and involved curtailing local privileges such as grazing
rights, firewood collection and grasscutting. Due to strong local protests,
demarcation had to be suspended and some of the initial restrictions relaxed but
felling of timber remained a state prerogative (Schickhoff 1 995a: 12). The
combination of high pressure and commercial exploitation in the Guzara Forests
continued well into the 1930s (Azhar 1993:120). In 1938 a commission reviewing
the management of the Guzara Forests advised that management should be
transferred to provincial forest departments and involve local users in management
(ibid.).
Not only the delimitation of Guzara Forests was problematic. The demarcation
of Reserved Forests in Kumaon (Uttar Pradesh, u.P.) met with very strong protest
and coincided with a nationwide outcry against British colonial oppression. In
1921 thousands of acres of forest were set ablaze in Kumaon and massive forest
fires raged for more than a month (ibid.: 118). Investigating the incident, a fact-
finding commission - the Wyndham Commission - concluded that the U.P. Forest
Department should devolve control of the new forest reserves to local villagers.
In 1923 the new forestry plan adopted the Wyndham Commission's recom-
mendations, and granted local vilagers (' concessionaries') more control of the use
of forest. According to the new plan, vilagers were now entitled to apercentage
of the revenues from commercial felling of forest. Instead of saving the trees, this
increased the logging pressure. Since the Forest Department lacked the manpower
resources to carry out logging, the department 'auctioned the right to harvest
marked trees in preannounced tracts each year. The winning bidders sent their own
crews into the hils to cut the purchased trees' (Tucker 1984:344). Since
competition was intense, 'winning bidders became determined to squeeze
maximum profits from their coupes' (Tucker 1982: 1 19). Despite local protests, this
'forester-contractor coalition' continued well into the 1930s (Tucker 1984:350).
World War Il and the transition to independence for Pakistan and India in 1947
marked a 'second great wave of deforestation' (Tucker 1988:91). High demand for
timber during the war meant that prices skyrocketed. By taking advantage of
favourable market conditions, 'private contractors could make fortunes in one
season by dealing directly with individual owners, of ten bypassing the Forest
3
Department entirely' (Tucker 1984:350). The forest policies of British India had
to a large degree 'saved' the Reserved Forests but there was a heavy toll on the
Guzara Forests after independence. In the late 1950s, the NWFP forest department
undertook heavy felling in the Guzara Forests (Azhar 1993:122).
Forest laws and classificatiQn in Pakistan
The colonial legacy of forest management is evident in present day Pakistan and
the forest legislation which was instituted before partition has to a large degree
remained unchanged.3 A legacy of its colonial past, the state of Pakistan inherited
a bundle of different legal categories of forest (Khattak 1976a, 1976b). As already
described, the major work of c1assifying forest was undertaken through region-by-
region land settlement in the 19th century. To document which rights
('concessions') had been granted to local people, their rights and privileges were
specified in a document known as the Wajib-ul-Arz ('land obligations') (Jan
1993: 17). These rights included firewood collection, grazing rights and the right
to timber for house construction.
Fore stry management in Pakistan is regulated by the Forest Act of 1927, and
for the Hazara Division especially, the Hazara Forest Act of 1936. While the
Forest Act of 1927 has been amended several times, there has not been any
changes concerning the penalties prescribed for offenders. As an example, the
maximum penalty under the Forest Act is stil either a fine of Rs. 500 or six
months in jail, penalties which are no longer adequate to discourage offenders.4
Ownership of forest in Pakistan is complex, with a number of legal categories
where ownership and use rights are shared between the state, the communities and
in some instances, individuals (NCS 1992: 174). The Forest Act distinguishes
between state-owned and private (i.e., non-state) forest (Table 1). Among state
owned forests, the two most important tenure c1asses are the Reserved and
Protected Forests. In Reserved Forests local people have no rights at all and even
firewood collection is prohibited. Moreover, all types of human use including
livestock grazing are prohibited, unless specifically permitted by the government
(Jan 1993:3). In Protected Forest this principle is reversed and with the exception
of commercial timber harvesting, both grazing and firewood collection are allowed
unless explicitly banned by the government. The Protected Forest category is often
used in cases where ownership is disputed, but is not meant to be a category
where fores t shall remain indefinitely (Khattak 1994:1).
3 However, Pakistan is currently undertaking a major revision of its environmental legislation
(Knudsen 1995). The most important planning documents are the 'National Conservation
Strategy' (1992), the 'Forestry Sector Master Plan' (1992) and the 'Sarhad Provincial
Conservation Strategy' (1993).
4 In practice, no-one has been sentenced to jail for vio1ating the forestry laws. In general they are
only asked to pay for the excess volume of timber. The value of Pakistan rupees is 30,86 to
US$ 1 (1995).
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Table L
Legal classification of forest in Pakistan
State
Category Ownership Management NWFP (km2) Pakistan
(km2)
Reserved Forests State State 940 16820
Protected Forests State State 40 9940
Other State State 1470 2510
Guzara Forests Communal State/Communa1 * 5850 6220
Communa1 Forests Communal Communal 8090 8780
Other Private State 420 510
Total 16810 45780
* Communal management by Forest Cooperative Societies,
Source: Jan (1993:7)
Private
The 'private forest category is the most problematic in Pakistan's forestry and
reflects the historical struggle between state and local communities for control
with forest. The two most important tenure classes are Guzara and Communal
Forests (Table 1). Guzara Forests proper are only found in the Hazara Division
and regulated by the Hazara Forest Act of 1936. Communal Forests are a sub-
category of Guzara Forests and mostly found outside settled areas.
While Guzara Forests can be owned either individually or jointly (families,
communities), Communal Forests are joint vilage property (Jan 1993:5). Although
both Guzara and Communal Forests are classified as 'private' (Table 1), they are
only nominally controlled by local communities and management is, in most
instances, a state prerogative. In general, these forest are the joint or communal
property of local shareholders who are entitIed to proceeds from the sales of
timber ('royalties'). The size of the royalties range from 60 to 80 per cent of the
revenues with the remainder going to the provincial government. The present
management system in private forests lacks credibility in the eyes of local
communities and have made them prone to over-exploitation. In order to
understand why, there is a need to look more closely at the system of forest
management and harvesting.
Forest management and harvesting
Most of the remaining coniferous forests in the NWFP are found in a narrow
altitudinal belt ranging from 1,500 to 3,000 meters above sea leveL. The conifers
which are commercially exploited are Himalayan cedar (Cedrus deodara,
'deodar'), spruce (Picea smithiana), silver fir (Abies pindrow), blue pine (Pinus
excelsa or wallchiana, 'kai!') and chir pine (Pinus longifolia). Himalayan cedar
is because of its high market value, the most intensely logged species, and due to
its climatic requirements, the conifer with the least spatial extension (Schickhoff
1995b:74ff).
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Forest planning in Pakistan has traditionally focused on timber harvesting rather
than forest regeneration. Forests in the NWFP are logged in accordance with a
harvesting plan, known as a 'Working Plan' (Khattak 1994). Areas suited for
commercial forestry are delineated into sections known as 'compartments' where
a prescribed harvesting volume ('prescribed yield') is fixed for the compartment
as well as the 'felling cycle', that is the period from one harvesting to the next.
A major problem with current Working Plans is that they prescribe aharvesting
volume which is too high and do not provide funds for regeneration (Khattak
1994). Despite official statistics showing massive tree-planting efforts in the
NWFP, regeneration of coniferous forests is low (cf. PFI 1992:7). The reasons for
this seem to be a combination of improper care and lack of technical expertise in
forest nurseries, free grazing of animals and land-use change.
The total volume to be logged from a compartment is known as the 'standing
volume'. The marked trees which together constitute the compartments standing
volume are cut, the bark removed and the logs transported to the nearest road.
From the perspective of sustainable use, it would have been preferable to transport
the timber as round logs which entails only 10-20 per cent volume loss. Most of
the timber which is logged in NWFP is, however, converted into scantlings
('scants', 'sleepers') which averages more than 50 per cent volume loss.
Conversion into scants is a wasteful harvesting method but preferred due to the
lack of motorable roads. The scants are transported down the steep mountain
slopes to the nearest road or stream on custom made slides (phatroo) built by
skiled lumberjacks. Arecent technical innovation is the use of skyline cranes
(zangã) which make it possible to transport round logs over great distances. Due
to higher initial purchasing costs sky line cranes are not yet in common use (cf.
Usui 1994:38).5 Whereas local technology such as timber slides and skyline
cranes have made it possible to harvest timber in steep slopes and distant valleys,
the construction of new roads simplify transport and increase logging pressure. A
recent study of fifteen field sites (primarily in the Northern Areas), confirms the
strong correlation between accessibility and deforestation (Schickhoff 1993a).6
The impact of timber logging is aggravated by crude felling methods which
cause collateral damage to timber stands. Instead of directional fellng, trees fall
downhil, thereby damaging standing trees and undergrowth (cf. Guha 1989: 166).
There is also a tendency not to spare seed trees with mature cones which are vital
to the natural regeneration of the species. Natural regeneration is also hampered
by a very high grazing pressure, especially in Guzara Forests where people have
rights to livestock grazing (Schickhoff 1995a: 14). There is also a substantial
5 For a more detai1ed comparison of the costs of various harvesting methods, see Ayaz and Stöhr
(1988).
6 Moreover, the studyestimates that 45 per cent of the forest cover has vanished, primarily
during the last 20 years. This coincides with the completion of the Karakoram Highway through
the region in the late 1960s and is further proof of the link between accessibility and
deforestation. The link between roads and deforestation is also documented by Khan et aL.
(1993:14) using remote sensing data from the Khurram Agency (FATA).
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piecemeal logging of single trees by subsistence users who ne ed timber for
firewood and as building materiaL. The most extensive forest loss is, however, due
to deliberate over-cutting and violation of Working Plans in the commercial
forestry sector. To understand the underlying causes, it is necessary to consider the
changes in the harvesting system and fores t policies which began in the 1970s.
Implications of changing forest policies
Forest administration in Pakistan is divided among the federal and the provincial
authorities, but implementing forest policies is a provincial responsibility. Until
1977 the NWFP Forest Department (FD) was in charge of both felling and
marketing operations. This organizational set-up was problematic because it was
not open to public scrutiny. Moreover, the FD was relIant upon private timber
merchants, 'forest contractors', for carrying out the actual timber harvesting. Until
1973 forest contractors could bid for standing trees and once they got the tender,
to ok charge of felling and marketing operations. Thus, forest contractors under
minimal FD supervision, logged the trees and later sold them. Known as the
'contract or 'permit system', this led to widespread over-harvesting. When the
contract system was abolished in 1973, no alternative had been prepared to replace
it. In order to strengthen the FD as well as to find an alternative to harvesting by
contractors, the Forest Development Cooperation (FDC) was established as a semi-
autonomous organization in 1977 (Jan 1990:28).7 The intention was to let the
FDC replace contractors and handle both harvesting and marketing. In re ali ty , the
FDC continued to sub-lease harvesting to contractors (Treacy 1994:7). However,
as long as contractors only logged the trees (i.e., they were labour contractors)
they had no vested interest in over-cutting but earned money from working
efficiently. Initially, the FDC only worked in government controlled Reserved
Forests in Hazara. The rates for felled timber were determined by calculating
backwards; from the market price to the standing trees ('stumpage rate'). In
Reserved Forests people have no share in the revenues, therefore the stumpage rate
was only a means to calculate the government revenue as well as the FDC's
administrative charges.
This changed when the FDC began timber harvesting in Hazara' s Guzara
Forests, where the local owners are entitled to proceeds from the sale of timber.
The Guzara Forest owners refused to be paid in accordance with the stumpage
rate. They argued that the FDC' s charges were too high, and due to lon g period
from harvesting began and until it was completed, the initial market price used did
not reflect ris ing timber prices. To solve the problem a commission was forme d
in 1977 to find an alternative to the stump age rate. In 1981 the commission
reached an agreement for a new system terme d the 'net-sale system' which would
7 The effectiveness of this organizational change has been questioned, and both the FD and FDC
have repeatedly been accused of bribery and corruption (The Frontier Post 16/12/92; The News
16/12/92).
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bring the value of timber in accordance with the market price. The net-sale system
was similar to the stumpage rate but the FDC's pre-calculated profit was fixed at
20 per cent. Moreover, owners had to give their written consent to the award of
contracts and royalties to owners were to be paid in instalments. The net-sale
system's advantage was that it gave forest owners a say in the award of contracts
and had in-built provisions for rising labour charges as well as timber prices.
Under the net-sale system the harvested timber is auctioned at official timber
markets and sold to the highest bidder. When the extraction costs (including taxes)
are deducted, the net revenue from the sales is divided between the state and the
local concessionaries. The net-sale system was gradually implemented from 1983-
84. Originally the net-sale system was designed for use in the Guzara Forests in
the Hazara Division but in 1981 the FDC tried to extend it to the Malakand
Division.
In order to explain the events which followed we have to consider the increase
in timber royalties from the mid-1970s. Initially, royalties were only paid to
concessionaries in Guzara Forests in the Hazara Division. The Hazara Forest Act
granted shareholders 80 per cent of the royalties while the state was entitled to the
remaining 20 per cent as administrative charges. Local communities in the
Malakand Division did not have such rights, because they were not provided for
in the Forest Act of 1927 and forest royalties were either very small or absent.
The reason for this is to be found in the recent history of the area. What is today
known as the Malakand Division was formerly ruled by three feudal principalities
governing Swat, Dir and Chitral (Barth 1985). In 1954 parts of the Swat
principality were declared a Tribal Area and all forests the property of the state.
The locals were accorded 10 per cent of the revenue. After abolition of the Swat
principality in 1969, the FD took charge of forest administration and fixed the
royalties at 5 per cent. After massive complaints, the royalties rose to an average
15 per cent in 1972. Later the same year the government dec1ared that all forests
in the former Swat principality would become property of the government (KIDP
1988). In 1974 the Forest Act of 1927 was extended to Swat, Dir and Chitral and
all forests declared Protected Forests. A year later, in 1975, they were re-classified
as Reserved Forests, the strictest tenure class in the forest legislation. In 1976 the
dissatisfaction with the government' s forest policy in general and the royalties in
particular sparked a revolt in Dir District (Malakand Division). The strength of this
protest forced the government to concede that whereas the Reserved Forest
c1assification would remain in place, in practice they would be managed as Guzara
Forests, and royalties ranging from 60 to 80 per cent paid to the local
concessionaries (Mumtaz 1989: 15ff.). In the following years this settlement was
extended to all the three districts (Swat, Dir and Chitral) of the Malakand Division
(Masud-ul-Mulk 1994:52).
This was the situation in 1981 when the FDC tried to reach an agreement with
the forest concessionaries in the Malakand Division. To the FDC this deal was
very important because the organization was obliged to deliver logs at fixed
concessionary rates to a new ly built woodprocessing plant in Chakdarra. Though
agreeing in principle to let the FDC begin harvesting, the forest owners in
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Malakand did not agree to be paid according to the net-sale system. They feared
that they would not be paid the real worth of the timber on the open market, but
the low concessionary rates of the Chakdarra processing plant. They therefore
demanded pre-fixed rates for their timber. To resolve the issue, a commission used
the same method which was utilized for ca1culating the stumpage rate; they
ca1culated backwards from the market price to the value of the standing trees. The
new pre-fixed rates per cft were; cedar (Rs. 51), blue pine (Rs. 37) and fir/spruce
(Rs. 22). The new pre-fixed rates did not take into account factors such as
problems connected to logging,distance from the road and that the rates had
already become outdated due to increased market prices. Thus, despite the fact that
the net-sale system was now in place, forest owners in the Malakand Division
were paid according to the what came to be known as the 'fixed-price system'.
When the Chakdarra factory was forced to close down in 1987, timber could
freely be auctioned on the open market. During the period 1981 -87 the market rate
of timber had surpassed the initial fixed-price rate. It was now suddenly in the
FDC's interest to keep the fixed-price system (in Malakand) because the
organization now took advantage of the price hike. In view of the fact that the pre-
fixed rates were no longer in their favour, the locals demanded higher prices for
their timber. The FDC, on its side, feared a lengthy battle over new rates and
advocated the virtues of the net -sale system with timber being auctioned at the
open market. By the end of the 1980s, two modes of royalty payment were in
place; a system of pre-fixed rates ('fixed-price system') and the net-sale system.
The significance of this development became even more important as the timber
prices escalated.8 As the gap between the pre-fixed rates and the market price of
timber continued to widen the incentive for pocketing this price difference rose,
and fores t contractor were quick to take advantage.
EconomIc strategi es of forest contractors
Despite Its virtues, the net-sale system never became popular among
concessionaries. The main reason was that after being sold on the market place,
the refunds from the sales passed through a slow bureaucratic treadmil before
being forwarded to the local owners. Both the delay and risk of pilfering that this
caused limited the net-sale system's popularity. The key to take advantage of the
net-sale system was to short-cut the payback process by offering to buy royalty
rights directly from forest owners.9 This was a variant of the pre-1973 'contract
system' where contractors to ok charge of harvesting and marketing and bought
standing trees directly from forest owners. Instead of waiting for the FDC to
ten der the work of logging a forest coupe, contractors approached local owners of
8 In 1984 cedar logs fetched Rs. 137 per cubic feet on the open market. During the period 1990-
95 the price went up from Rs. 199 to Rs. 400 (PFI 1992:15).
9
It is important to note that whereas over-cutting is illegal, buying fores t royalties is not.
Although undesirable from the point of sustainable forestry, forest royalties can be traded.
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compartments which shortly were to be harvested. The contractor could find out
this by consulting the Working Plan, which is an offcial document listing when
compartments are to be logged and h.ow much is to be extracted. In those areas
where offcial land titling has been completed (for example, most of Swat
District), ownership of forest is fixed in an official record (catoni) maintained by
the local revenue officer (patwari) with the name of every owner and their shares
(bach) in the forest. From this document it is possible to glean the number and
identity of the shareholders. To the contractor such detailed information about
ownership makes it possible to assess the risk of royalty rights acquisition.
Moreover, land settlement in itself reduces the risk of royalty rights purchase
because it minimizes ownership disputes. Usually, the contractor negotiates royalty
rights purchase with representatives of the owners. For the owners the main
advantage is getting paid in advance, instead of having to wait until the
compartment is logged.
In areas where offcial land titlng has been resisted (for example, District
Kohistan), there is no offcial record of ownership. In general, forest ownership
is shared by all vilagers and subject to local negotiations. lO Ownership is often
contested and may cause bitter fight among vilages and tribes. This makes royalty
rights purchase more risky and because all the shareholders must agree to sell,
becomes time consuming and difficult. Due to such problems, harvesting falls far
be hind that planned under W orking Plans and the harve sted volume is, in
exceptional cases, only 5 per cent of that prescribed under Working Plans.
However, in some areas forest ownership has be en usurped by powerfulleaders
(maliks, khans), who sell royalty rights at their own discretion. Where features of
social organization allow it, contractors can therefore negotiate directly with local
power-holders. This makes it easier to close deals and, in turn, allows harve sting
to proceed in accordance with Working Plans (Knudsen, forthcoming).
For the contractor it is crucial for making a profit that vilagers agree to sell
their royalty rights. Without acquiring these rights he is only paid for felling the
timber and bringing it to the roadside depot ('labour contractor'). This is a type
of work which does not generate substantial profits. In general, contractors offer
to pay slightly more than the FDC's pre-fixed rates. For example, the contractor
wil offer to pay Rs. 60 per cubic feet for cedar, compared to the FDC's fixed
rates of Rs. 51. Should the owners stil decline to sell their royalty rights, the
contractor may try to enlist the support of influential elders, the 'white beards'
(spin giris) and powerful members of local consensual assemblies (jirga) by
secretly offering them better than average terms. Thus, the contractor takes
advantage of his knowledge of social organization and vilage politics. Another
asset is the contractor's knowledge of forest operations and market conditions.
When the compartment comes up for tender, the contractor enters the bidding
round. Having already purchased the royalty rights, he can undercut the price of
all other bidders.
10 For a discussion of common property rights in forest, see McKean and Ostrom (1995).
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Table 2
Net profit to stakeholders with royalty rights purchase
(harve sting volume 100,000 cft12832 m3) *
FDC' s profit (20%) 664,000
Government (40%) 8,000,000
Contractor 8,400,000Community 3,600,000
(Community, no sale of royalty rights) (18,000,000)
* Appendix I gives details
The FDC on its side, is obliged to award the tender to the lowest bidder. Il When
the contractor is awarded the contract, he is in re al it y entering as contractor the
same forest coupe which he has bought through the royalty rights purchase. It is
therefore in the contractor's interest to cut more trees than have been marked. As
the owner of the royalty rights, his gross profit wil be proportional to the amount
of timber being auctioned at the timber market.
To explain how this works, consider the following example (for details, see
Appendix I). The contractor purchases the royalty rights from the community
according to a negotiated fixed price, in this case Rs. 60 per cubic foot. After
being awarded the tender by the FDC, the contractor (or his associates) hires
skilled lumberjacks who fell the trees and handle the transport to roadside depots.
When the timber has reached the depot, the harvested volume is controlled and
verified by the FD. If found to be in order, the FD issues a 'transit pass' which
enables the FDC to move the logs to the timber market where it is sold according
to the 'net-sale system'. As noted above, the current market price of cedar is more
than four times higher than the price offered to locals. The revenues from the sales
(less the costs of extraction) are divided as 40 per cent to the government and 60
per cent to the locals as royalties. Since the contractor has already purchased the
royalty rights, the 60 per cent wil be transferred to him directly or through a
middleman (Table 2, Appendix I for details).
The gross profit to the contractor is therefore the difference between the costs
of purchasing the royalty rights based on the negotiated fixed price and the sum
transferred back to him after the timber has been sold according to the net -sale
system. In the example above (Table 2), the contractor has more than 200 per cent
return on his investment. Neither the government' s profit (40 per cent of the net
revenue) nor the FDC's precalculated profit are affected by the royalty rights
purchase (Appendix I). The community members, however, earn only about 20 per
cent (3,6 million) of what they could have earned had they decided not to sell
il Even if the FDC suspects that royalty purchase is involved, it is bound by the law to accept the
lowest bid. However, in order to block tender bids which grossly underestimate the costs of
logging, the FDC has begun to fix a minimum price which is quoted in the tender notice.
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their royalty rights and opted for the net-sale system directly (18 milion).12
Instead, it is the contractor who profits from the price difference between the
negotiated rate and the market price. To understand the reasons why rural
communities accept such deals and are wiling to sell their timber below its market
value, it is necessary to look more c10sely at the factors which locals must
consider when deciding whether to sell or not.
EconomIc rationality, risk and decisionmaking
Despite the financial clout and ingenuity of forest contractors it remains an enigma
why vilagers who may be iliterate, but certainly know basic arithmetic, agree to
sell their timber for less than one-fourth of its present market value. In order to
understand why local forest owners prefer to sell to forest contractors, one has to
consider the poverty which characterizes much of Pakistan's countryside. In
general, people lack opportunities for paid work and timber is therefore the only
commodity which has the potential to contribute substantially to household
earnings. In isolated vilages where the 1ack of roads hinders marketing of
agricultural products, income from forest royalties can be critical to their
livelihood (cf. The News 14/12/92). The vilagers' primary economic assets are
therefore their rights to timber royaltes. They generally lack the specialized skills
and equipment needed for commercial fellng of timber. Moreover, they lack
crucial information about market mechanisms and have immediate needs for cash
income. To an outsider, the advantages of the net-sale system seem obvious.
Instead of agreeing to low pre-fixed rates, the vilagers are entitled to 60 or 80 per
cent of the much higher market value. However, villagers tend to distrust
government officials and are suspicious of the net-sale system. In addition there
are a number of other reasons why it is rational for vilagers to sell their royalty
rights to contractors. They can be summarized as follows (Khattak 1994):
· vilagers lack information about the felling schedule, hence do not know when
their forest(s) are to be logged
· even when vilagers have secure information about felling schedules, they
know that felling schedules can be changed or manipulated
· vilagers are under the impression that only by agreeing to contractors' offer
wil their forests be logged according to the felling schedule.
· due to the poverty which is typical of the countryside, vilagers must look to
immediate needs and not to future benefits, in other words, they have a high
discount rate.
The reasons for selling royalty rights to fores t contractors seem to be a
combination of poverty (high discount rate), the uncertainty which affict logging
12
The example is based on harvesting of round logs. Harvesting as scants (50-55 per cent volum e
loss) reduces the profit to local owners to less than 10 per cent of the market value (HJP n.d.).
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operations, combined with the risks associated with future compensation. If the
locals were to comply with FDC' s harvesting regulations, they would neither be
paid in advance nor assured of being paid later.13 From this perspective it
becomes understandable why accepting the contractor' s offer of immediate cash
payment is so attractive, even though it in purely economic terms gives them only
about 20 per cent of the timber' s market value.
Vilagers' previous encounters with the state and its representatives have made
them aware of risks associated with timber logging. They therefore prefer to take
what they can now and leave the economic risk to others. Moreover, locals fear
that future market prices may turn out in their disfavour (Treacy 1994:5). The
wilingness to forego a future benefit as their practice implies, suggests that 'risk
discounting' (Angelsen 1994) is a significant factor and promotes short-term
decisions. Whereas payments in the order of Rs. 3,6 milion may seem very large
(Table 2), individual forest owners are entitled only to a fraction of this sum. In
general, all male members of a vil age or tribal segment are entitled to a share of
the forest royalties. If the number of shareholders is 1,000, this wil give each
person Rs. 3,600. This sum is only slightly less than the average annual cash
income (Rs. 4,000) in parts of Kohistan and underlines the importance of timber
royalties to household viability (Usui 1994:9).
Despite the overall profitability of royalty rights purchase, contractors face
various economic risks which can either diminish revenues or cause heavy
financiallosses. In particular, there is concern over factors which hinder logging
of compartments according to the fellng schedule, meaning that money invested
in royalty rights purchase cannot be recovered. Examples of potential hazards from
the perspective of contractors are:
· owners feel cheated and ask for more money
· influential vilagers change their mind about the deal
· roadside timber depots are set on fire to protest unjust deals or settle grievances
· the FD stops the transport of timber due to irregularities (over-cutting)
· local disputes over forest ownership delay or block logging/transport operations
· higher costs than assumed (higher transport co st, less outturn volume)
· natural calamities or interventions (flash floods, timber logging ban)
It is common for large contractors to sub-Iease part of the total logging work to
sub-contractors (petty contractors). Generally, felling and conversion into scants
and transportation to roadside depots are sub-Ieased to petty contractors. This is
both a practical way of handling large fellng operations as well as to some degree
spreads the economic risk. Moreover, contractors tend cover risks on investment
by extensive over-cutting (HJP 1993a). A case study from District Kohistan shows
13 The FDC is obliged to pay 10-20 per cent of the net revenue as advance payment to
concessionists. However, it is likely that payments, in reality, are either much less or withheld
by the FDC.
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that two compartments were over-cut by close to 300 per cent in the case of cedar
and 180 per cent in the case of blue pine, the two most valuable tree species (D sui
1994:28-29).
Despite the economic limitations contractors face, it is exactly their central role
in the rural credit market and abilty to extend credit in advance of logging
operations, which enable them to control the timber logging business. This in
particular is the case in District Kohistan where the local population did not permIt
the FDC to take charge of forest harvesting.14 Conceding to the demands, the
government has since 1981 allowed local shareholders to take control of harvesting
through the creation of Forest Harvesting Societies. Regulations require harvesting
societies to pay harvesting costs in advance of market sale, money they typically
lack. To underwrite such expenditures, harvesting societies could seek to obtain
a bank loan. However, because bank loans with interest are considered un-Islamic,
they instead prefer to accept advanee payments from contractors who purchase
forest royalties and take contral over harvesting operations (HJP 1993b). Thus,
ve sting management responsibility with local communities did not decrease
contractors' economic leverage. While the locals in Kohistan were only granted
the right to harvest their forests, Guzara owners in the Hazara Division were
allowed to take charge of both harvesting and management. The reform quickly
became a battle ground for various vested interests and a test case for institutional
reform in the forestry sectol.
Forest Cooperative SocIeties and the tim ber ban
Forest management in the Hazara Division is regulated by the Hazara Forest Act
of 1936. In order to promote conservation and give local communities more
control of their forests the government amended the Hazara Forest Act in 1981.
The amendment opened for Guzara Forests to be managed by communities
organized as Forest Cooperative Societies (FCS) where local stakeholders are
members. Most importantly, the reform allowed cooperative societies to take
charge of fellng and marketing operations in Guzara Forests under their contra!.
Between 1981 and 1992 about 33 forest cooperatives were formed (Cernea
1989:62-63). Since their inception the forest cooperatives have generated a lot of
controversy and accused of promoting uncontrolled felling. An evaluation report
concluded that; 'all the cooperative societies, in clear violation ...(of rules)... have
sold standing trees or converted timber through forest contractors, thereby
undermining the concept of co operative working. After purchasing trees, the
contractors are felling trees and extracting timber' (Jan 1990:92).
14 Instead of timber logging being based on open tenders, deals are settled directly between forest
owners and contractors. Essentially, the only tas k left to the local FD is to ensure that the
timber has been cut in accordance with Working Plans and collect the government revenue (20
per cent).
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Table 3
Reduction in forest cover (District Mansehra, Hazara Division)
Legal status 1979 1988 % Loss
Reserved Forest 10,950 5,903 46
Protected Forests 4,648 2,370 49
FCS Forests * 11,098 7,907 29
Other Guzara forests 4,170 1,936 54
Total demarcated area 30,866 18,116 41
* Guzara Forests managed by Forest Cooperative Societies
Source: SDPI (1995:32)
The report also argued that the cooperatives had been hijacked by influential
individuals with avested interest in over-cutting, thus 'small owners are not
accepted in the societies unless they agree to sell standing trees or converted
timber to the big owners or forest contractors selected by them at the terms and
rates dictated by the big owners' (ibid.:92).
Forest loss in parts of the Hazara Division is staggering. Using remote sensing
data it has been estimated that the reduction of the forest cover in the Guzara
Forests in District Mansehra is c10se to 55 per cent in just nine years (Table 3).15
Contrary to popular opinion, forest loss during the period 1979-88 is lower in
Guzara Forests managed by forest cooperative societies than in the other legal
forest c1asses (Table 3). One of the reasons for this can be that cooperative
societies in charge of Guzara Forests ban non-members from collecting firewood.
To fil their need for firewood they have to exploit surrounding forests in the other
forest classes (Khattak 1994).
Probably, there would have been little national atten ti on to the controversy over
forest cooperatives in Hazara had it not been for an unexpected event. In the
beginning of September 1992 Northern Pakistan was struck by torrential rains
which developed into a devastating flood. Among the hardest affected areas was
the Hazara Division. In the aftermath of the disaster, extensive over-cutting of
forest was identified as one of the major causes of the destruction (Ilyas 1992).
The removal of the forest cover, it was argued, had allowed water to be discharged
directly into the swelling rivers, thereby contributing to the extensive flood
damage. 16 In addition to the flood water, much of the damage to bridges and
15 This should be considered a worst-case scenario and is primarily based on data from the Siran
valley. A recent study from the Kaghan valley (Mansehra District) shows that the major part
of the forest loss took place in the 19th century . Population pressure in the 20th century has,
in comparison, not had significant impact on the forest cover (Schickhoff 1993b: 176ff.,
1995a: 14ff.).
16 Despite the uncertainty of such a c1aim, it underlines that the environment in Hazara is under
stress and, so far, the inability to address it. For an analysis of the link between loss of fores t
cover and floods, see Hamilton (1992: 17ff..
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houses was caused by huge amounts of 10gs and scants awaiting transport from
forest and roadside depots. Propelled by the flood these logs crushed everything
in their wayY
Officially , the rampant deforestation in Hazara was blamed on the timber
harvesting carried out by forest cooperative societies. To end the heavy toll on
forest in Hazara the government sought to suspend them but legal entanglements
made this difficult. As a last resort for curbing the cooperative societies the
caretaker government chose to impose a general ban on logging in all of Pakistan,
including the nominal 'free state' of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. By a direct order
from the Prime Minister, the thirty-three cooperative societies in the Hazara
Division were suspended and a two-year nationwide moratorium on timber
harvesting imposed from the autumn of 1992 (Prime Minister's Directive 1993).
There was widespread criticism of this decision and demands that the ban should
be lifted because timber was 'the only source of income for locals in Kohistan and
other northern areas' (The Frontier Post 16/12/92). Moreover, the former
provincial minister for forests in the NWFP, argued that the FDC and not the
cooperative societies should be blamed for the rapid deforestation in Hazara' s
Guzara Forests (ibid.):
(the minister) said that the FDC's officials right from the top to the bottom are
involved in corruption and nobody could be absolved from charges of corruption
and negligence. ... Re also accused the FDC for doing nothing in the development
of forest in the province. Re said that the provincial government was not taken into
confidence by the federal government before announcing a ban on Forest
Cooperative Societies.
Similar points were raised by speakers in the NWFP provincial assembly who
argued that unilaterally 'blaming the cooperative societies for the whole affair was
not correct as most of the cuttings was being done under the supervision of the
FDC' (The News 16/12/92). The press toa c1aimed that the FDC had 'merely
replaced the private contractors as irresponsible exploiters of forest resources'
(Ilyas 1992:26) while others c1aimed that the FDC had collaborated with 'large
forest owners and assist(ed) contractors in cutting trees ilegally from the Reserved
Forests' (SDPI 1995:43). The FCS's were charged with ilegal activities too, such
as keeping fake records of timber auctions, cartel formation and appropriation of
money to be set aside for afforestation (ibid.:40ff.). The FD also was criticized
because W orking Plans prepared by the department allowed commercial harve sting
at unsustainable levels (ibid.:43). The FD, on its part, blamed high grazing
pressure, itinerant nomads (gujars) and low survival rate of planted trees (The
News 01/11/94). In short, all sides in this conflct, at one point or the other, were
charged with responsibility for the disaster.18
17 For an excellent overview of the issues at stake in Hazara, see Minissale (1991).
18 Afghan refugees who were settled in the Hazara Division may also have been implicated in the
rapid deforestation (cf. Allan 1987).
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To complicate the matter, the Hazara Division is an ethnic hotchpotch where
some groups (Swatis and Syeeds) have traditionally been political patrons and
landowners (Ahmed 1986: 1 15; SDPI 1995:38). Some members of these groups
have over time been able to take control of large parts of the Guzara Forests,
which in turn have enabled them to disregardWorking Plans and make huge
personal fortunes. SUNGI Development Foundation, a 10cal NGO, has been a
vocal critic of the forest policies in Hazara (The News 01/1 1/94). By siding with
the vilagers against the powerful landlords and Guzara owners, SUNGI' s staff
have put themselves at risk by exposing the extent of ilegal timber harvesting
(SUNGI 1995). The controversy over forest co operative societies has been a stark
reminder of the problems facing sustainable forestry not only in Hazara but in the
NWFP in general. In addition to immediate effects on the domestic forestry sector,
the moratorium on logging turned out to have implications for timber harvesting
in a neighbouring country - Afghanistan.
Cross- border timber trade
The trade in timber from Eastern and Central Afghanistan to British India dates
back to the second half of the 19th century (Fischer 1970:8lff.). Timber was
initially transported on the rivers, later to be replaced by overland transport using
camels. Most of this early export of timber was used for extending the railway
network to cities such as Peshawar (1882) and later to strategic border posts such
as the Khyber Pass (1912). In the early 20th century much of the timber was
needed for the growing domestic consumption. Improvement of the road network
in the 1950s eased the transport of timber inside Afghanistan. While the Afghan
timber market was in balance, Pakistan experienced a net deficit of timber
(ibid.: 129). Market conditions favoured timber export to Pakistan which expanded
rapidly during the 1960s (Rathjens 1974:303ff). In the 1970s, timber being sold
in Pakistan commanded three to four times higher prices than what could be
earned in markets in Kabul (Fischer 1970: 100).
The limited scale of the mixed mountain agriculture practised by Pashtuns in
Eastern Afghanistan made additional income vital (ibid.: 127). This is one
explanation why the modern commercial trade in timber was handled almost
exclusively by Pashtuns who employed camel herding no mads for transporting
timber across the border to Pakistan. The profitability of this trade also enticed
sedentary farmers take up timber transport and buy their own camels. For the
nomadic pastoralists the timber trade could be integrated with their seasonal
migration to winter pastures in Pakistan (Rathjens 1974:305). Moreover, immigrant
Pashtuns who settled in Pakistan to ok active part in the Pakistani timber trade and
expanded into Kohistani areas of Northern Pakistan (Fischer 1970: 1 18). .
Due to the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan in 1978, little is know n about
the cross-border timber trade in the period 1975-90. Nevertheless, the imposition
of the timber ban in Pakistan in 1992 made cross-border timber trade more
profitable. Despite the fact that the timber ban has not been strictly enforced, it is
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likely that the moratorium to some degree forced a relocation of logging activities
from Pakistan to Afghanistan. It has been argued that Pashtun timber merchants
earlier were unable to expand their timber trade beyond the linguistic boundary
presented by the non-Pashtun (Nuristani) speaking areas of Eastern Afghanistan
(Fischer 1970: 127). This no longer seems to be the case. Much of the present
logging activity now takes place in Nuristan (Nuristani 1994:30). In response to
the timber ban, Pakistani timber merchants acting in collusion with local
contractors in Kunar - colloquially known as 'quick (rich) Khans' (Samdasti
Khans) - intensified their logging activity. The timber was later stockpiled along
the Pakistan-Afghan border (ibid.:31). During a three-months period in 1993
Pakistan authorities lifted the import ban, which allowed the timber merchants to
transport an estimated 3,000 truck-loads of timber across the border (Ismael
1994:21).19 Information provided by MADERA, a French NGO working in
Afghanistan, estimates that 300,000 cubic metres of timber have been sold
annually to Pakistan (Jungle 1993). This information is confirmed by an eye-
witness account by the Danish anthropologists Asger Christensen (1995:83):
(the) few remaining forests in Paktia and Kunar are being cut down at an alarming
rate and exported to Pakistan. Although there is a high demand for timber for
reconstruction in Afghanistan, the purchasing power is high er in Pakistan and the
timber goes there. ... The often desperately poar communities, who hold the
traditional rights to the forests, sell these to Afghan timber merchants, some of
whom are mujaheddin commanders who act in collusion with Pakistan i traders.
Pakistan maintains a ban on the import of timber but occasionally this ban is lifted
for a certain period. What then could be observed during i 993 was the build-up of
huge stock of timber on the Afghan side of the border, the lifting of the Pakistani
import ban for a few weeks, and the rapid transport by hundreds of trucks of these
stocks to Pakistan.
The civil war in Afghanistan has prec1uded any effective control with timber
export as well as increased the need for alternative cash income among the
resident population and, even more so, the local warlords. The current export of
timber has its roots in 19th century timber trade, and now as well as earlier, the
driving force behind the trade is the much higher prices of timber in Pakistan.
Timber is a commodity whose origin is hard to trace and the difference between
'legal' and 'ilegal' timber is blurred. After taxes and pen alt y fees have been paid,
timber is technically legal and can freely be moved to Pakistani timber markets.
On a more generallevel, the cross-border timber trade shows that a strictly 'local'
perspective on the dynamics of deforestation in the NWFP is inadequate and that
forest contractors maintain networks which go beyond the confines of the locality.
19 Another source estimates that 13,000 truck-loads of timber crossed the border to Pakistan
(Nuristani 1994:31).
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Forest contractors as rural entrepreneurs
Forest contractors have been an integral part of the commercial exploitation of
forest since the mid-19th century and were also at that time accused of 'cutting
more trees than they had legally purchased' (Tucker 1982: 11 9). The public image
of forest contractors has been, and stil is, very poor. Popular opinion conceive of
contractors as 'forest thieves' (jungle chor) (Ahmed 1986: 1 15) and blames them
for all that is wrong in Pakistan's forest management. Especially, the collusion
between political and economic interests, which in the press is often described as
a 'timber mafia' (Iyas 1992:36; Nasar 1995:7; Yusufzai 1992) permit politicians,
large contractors and bureaucrats to develop informal networks which give them
immunity from forest laws and a carte blanche to undertake forest operations at
their own discretion. In my opinion, some of the complaints against contractors
are misplaced. It is loopholes in the forest 1egislation combined with weaknesses
in the organization of forest harvesting which have enabled contractors to prosper.
This could not, however, have been possible without the cooperation of local FD
and FDC staff. The payment of bribes (baksheesh, sifareesh) is common in
Pakistan, and is naturally also frequent in a setting where a valuable commodity
is involved. This fact is acknowledged both in the higher echelons of the FD and
FDC, as well as among forest contractors. Pakistan' s forest policies allow forest
contractors to establish themselves as brokers between the provincial bureaucracy
and rural communities. They have detailed information about the harvesting
procedures, timber prices and regulations governing timber logging. Moreover, as
natives of the area they know the sentiments, needs and demands of local
people.20 By combining such insights, forest contractors turn their middleman
position into commercial profit. Another asset is their central position in the rural
credit market and ability to underwrIte harvesting costs prior to logging operations
(HJP 1993b). Forest contractors are not, however, a uniform group. They range
from small businessmen to wealthy patrons ('timber barons') with the financial
clou t to undertake large fellng operations, using mechanized equipment and their
own workforce of skilled lumberjacks. From the perspective of forest owners,
collaborating with forest contractors is at present their best option for getting a
share of their forests' worth. From the perspective of the forest administration
forest contractors are - due to their ability to work in a hostile tribal setting - a
vital link to the local forest owners, thereby making logging possible.
Analytically, forest contractors can be characterized as rural entrepreneurs
(Barth 1972:6). Etymologically, the word entrepreneur stems from the French verb
entreprendre which means 'to undertake' . Entrepreneurs are profit motivated,
innovate newavenues of transaction and are wiling to take risks (ibid.:8). Forest
contractors exploit discrepancies between economic spheres and tend to position
themselves in such away that they reap profits from bridging spheres. As Barth
has noted 'entrepreneurs wil explore various possible implications of de facto
20 Forest contractors tend to begin their career in their area of origin, but as they gain more wealth
and experience, expand their operations to newareas (cf. Knudsen, forthcoming).
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situations, and where it seems to their advantage, choose to exploit any one or
several of the unplanned or even undesired implications of governmental action'
(ibid.: 17). In this case, forest contractors to ok advantage of the fact that whereas
the fixed-price system had been replaced by the net-sale system, the former system
persisted - albeit informally - as a simple and generally accepted mode of royalty
payment. By combining the two modes of royalty payment, forest contractors were
able to make a profit from short-cutting the pay-back process.
Conclusion
Environmental problems are complex, involve many conflcting interests and of ten
become politicized. Thus, 'deforestation' becomes entangled in social, economic
and political webs which are not only difficult to come to grips with, but of ten
outright impossible. The plural causes of deforestation in Pakistan ilustrate this
complexity and represent a challenge to sustainable forest management. This does
not mean that Pakistani authorities are uninterested in promoting sustainable
forestry. They are, but the odds are great. To understand the problems affecting
Pakistan's forestry sector one has to consider a number of factors: the role of the
state and the bureaucracy ('institutions'), the costs involved in changing the
present organization of forestry ('transaction costs'), short term returns against
long term profitability ('discounting') and the motivation of the individual against
the interests of the collective (the problem of 'collective action').
As long as poverty, population growth and limited cultivatable land are
characteristics of the countryside, the problem of creating incentives for conserving
forest remains. The economic value of forest in a context of rural poverty should
be the baseline for any investigation into the causes of deforestation in Pakistan.
COlloborating this view, the economic analysis of the profits that accrue from
timber harvesting shows that rural forest owning communities are, at best, paid
only 20 per cent of the timber's market value. The lion's share of the profit is
pocketed by forest contractors, the FDC and the provincial treasury. The key to
understand the wilingness to sell royalty rights is rural poverty and urgent need
for cash (high discount rate). The importanee of market forces for deforestation
is also evident in the cross-border trade with Afghanistan. Since the 1960s, forest
contractors have taken advantage of the fact that low-priced timber from
Afghanistan can be sold at much higher prices in Pakistan.
Property rights are also at stake. Behind the private forest category lies a long
standing struggle between the state and local communities for control with forest.
The historical resistance to state control makes local owners feel justified in
managing their forests as they see fit. SeIlng forests ('alienation'), in this
perspective, becomes the ultimate manifestation of this ownership. This strategy
is reinforced by the uncertainty which afficts logging operations as well as the
economic needs faced by local owners. In the private forests people have joint
property rights, i.e., they are shareholders in a common property forest resource.
It may be tempting to attribute the failure of forest management to the 'the tragedy
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of the commons' (Hardin 1968). There is no indication, however, that collective
ownership in itself promotes deforestation. To the contrary, tentative evidence
suggests that collective ownership to forest makes it more difficult for contractors
to settle deals with the many owners (high transaction costs). If a contractor
suspects that there are unresolved forest ownership disputes among the
shareholders, he might decide not to proceed with royalty rights purchase since he
risks not recovering his money as long as the compartment cannot be logged. In
comparison, privatization of forest ownership by local power holders eases the
purchase of royalty rights and allows logging to progress in accordance with
Working Plans.
Entrepreneurship is deeply ingrained in the environmental history of South
Asian fore stry and there is a historical continuity from the role contractors played
in pre-partition India to present day Pakistan. The study of entrepreneurship adds
to the understanding of deforestation by providing a framework for analyzing how
concurrent proeesses prepared the ground for the entrenchment of forest
contractors after 1987. First, the unintentional implementation of a two-price
system enabled contractors to buy forest royalties directly from the owners and
sell timber with a huge profit at timber markets. Secondly, conceding to local
demands for better payment and higher forest royalties, more of the funds from
logging were earmarked for local communities. This should, in theory, benefit the
owners but instead increased the economic payoff to contractors. At the same time,
rising timber prices boosted the incentive to manipulate the payback process. The
creation of the FDC and separation of management from harvesting were meant
to prevent forest contractors from becoming part of harvesting operations, but
neither improved the FDC's relations with forest owners nor reduced contractors'
leverage on the countryside.
Turning to sustainability of the fore stry sector, the current harvesting system
and management practices have failed. Violation of harvesting plans and over-
cutting are common and threatens the biodiversity of Northern Pakistan (Duke
1994). This problem is aggravated by inadequate attention to forest regeneration
and tree planting. Remaining forests should neither be viewed as a source of
provincial revenue nor wasted by outdated harvesting methods. Whereas forest
contractors tend to be blamed for everything that is wrong in Pakistan's forestry
sector, it is the FD and FDC which should bear the main responsibility for the
failure of the current management and harvesting practices. Forest management is
suffering from unclear management objectives and bureaucratic ineptitude in a
con text of high urban demand for timber. If the bureaucrats and the field staff had
enforced forest legislation to the letter of the law, the scale of ilegal activity
would have been significantly reduced. The extensive over-cutting,
mismanagement and malpractice found in the forestry sector are unimaginable
unless custodians either turn a blind eye or accept bribes.
Are the problems in Pakistan's forestry sector an argument for vesting
management with local communities or is the interest of conservation better served
by state management? Without the state actively promoting sustainable forestry,
little can be done to salvage Pakistan's remaining forests. The case of Forest
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Co operative Societies in Hazara shows that devolving management responsibility
is, in itself, not enough to create avested interest in conservation. Instead this
allowed the seizure of power by large shareholders, reflecting rural power
imbalances and sUlviving patron-client relationships.
Dixon and Perry have argued that 'most of the effects of environmental
mismanagement observed in (NorthernJ Pakistan are rooted in the environmental
iliteracy of the population' (Dixon and Perry 1986:304). This is a distortion of
facts and based on a superficial understanding of the situation facing rural people.
It also perpetuates the mistaken view that people are not interested in conservation
of natural resources. The problem is not to convince fores t-dependent communities
that they have a stake in the protection of forests - they know this very well - but
the structural and institutional problems which prevent them from playing any
meaningful part in their management. This does not mean that local people are
necessarily motivated by an 'environmental ethic'. It does mean that they would
protect their forest if they were assured of enjoying the future benefits This is a
conclusion borne out of the last ten years of research on common pool regimes
(Berkes 1989; McCay and Acheson 1987).
The World Conservation Union has dec1ared that the 'institutional problems
facing forestry in Pakistan include outdated forest policies and laws' (IUCN
1993:73). There is at the moment a commitment both at the federal and the
provincial leve! not only to amend the forest legislation in the NWFP but to
implement a new legal and institutional framework concerned with fore st
management and conservation. This wil be a crucial test of whether the federal
government can come to grips with the problems affecting the forestry sector. The
timber ban which was imposed in 1992 has been extended until further notice.
This has given the government a breathing space in order to reconsider its forest
policies. The opportunity should not be missed.
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Appendix I
Example of payoffs by combining the fixed-price and the net-sale system,
(harvesting volume 100,000 cf ti 2832 m3)
Assumed figures Standing volurne
Outturn, % of all
Outturn ('converted volume') *
Negotiated rate
Harvest charges
Carriage charges
Taxes
Managerial charges
Market rate
Projected costs Harvest charges
Carriage
Taxes
Managerial
Total
+ FDC pre-calculated profit (20%)
Grand total
Revenue Gross revenue (80,000 cf t x 300)
Total costs
Net revenue t
Government (40%)
Contractor's profit Contractor (60%)
Royalty rights purchase (60,000 cf t x 60) :t
Net
Community's profit Net (60,000 cf t x 60)
(Potential 60,000 cf t x 300)
100,000 cf t
80%
80,000 cf t
60 Rs./cft
20 Rs./cft
5 Rs./cft
20 Rs./cft
10 Rs./cft
300 Rs./cft
1,600,000
40,000
1,600,000
80,000
3,320,000
664,000
"" 4,000,000
24,000,000
- 4,000,000
20,000,000
8,000,000
.....................................
12,000,000
- 3,600,00
8,400,000
.....................................
3,600,000
.....................................
(18,000,000)
* The outturn rate is commonly around 50 per cent (conversion into scants). Here the best
possible option is explored (timber extracted as round logs). Please note that figures for taxes
and charges are approximations.
-i Net revenue, split between the government (40%) and the contractor (60%).
:Ç The contractor pays only for the community's part of stÍmding volume (60%). Of ten
royalty rights purchase is based on the 'converted volume'. This further decreases the
community' s profit.
Source: Mohammad Yusuf and author
23
References
Ahmed, Akbar S. 1986. Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in
South Asia. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
Allan, Nigel J.R. 1987. 'Impact of Afgan refugees on the vegetation resources
of Pakistan' s Hindu- Kush Himalayas'. Mountain Research and Development,
7(3):200-204.
AngeIsen, Arild. 1994. 'Shifting cultivation, expansion and intensity of
production: The open economy case. CMI Working Paper, 1994:3.
Ayaz, Mohammad and Gerhard Stöhr. 1988. 'Comparison of timber harvesting
systems in the forest areas of Hazara Civil Division, N.W.F.P.' Pakistan
Journal of Forestry, 38(4):261-274.
Azhar, Rauf A. 1989. 'Communal property rights and depletion of forests in
Northern Pakistan'. The Pakistan Development Review, 28(4):643-651.
-. 1993. 'Commons, regulation, and rent-seeking behavior: The dilemma of
Pakistan's guzara forests'. Economic Development and Cultural Change,
42(1): 1 15- 129.
Barth, Fredrik (ed.). 1972. The Role of the Entrepreneur in Social Change in
Northern Norway. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
-. 1985. The Last Wali of Swat. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Berkes, Fikret (ed.). 1989. Common Property Resources: Ecology and
Community-Based Sustainable Development. London: Belhaven Press.
Cernea, Michael M. 1989. User Groups as Producers in Participatory
Afforestation Strategies. Washington D.C.: World Bank Discussion Papers,
No. 70.
Christensen, Asger. 1995. Aiding Afghanistan: The background and prospects
for reconstruction in a fragmented society. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of
Asian Studies (NIAS), Report No. 26.
Dixon, R. K. and 1. A. Perry. 1986. 'Natural resource management in rural
areas of Northern Pakistan'. Ambio, 15:301-305.
Duke, Guy. 1994. 'A participatory approach to conservation safeguarding the
Himalayan forests of the Palas valley, District Kohistan'. In: Asian Study
Group. The Destruction of the Forests and Wooden Architecture of Eastern
Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan: Nuristan to Baltistan. Islamabad: Asian
Study Group, pp. 40-48.
Fischer, Dieter. 1970. Waldverbreitung, bäuerliche Waldwirtschaft und
kommerzieZZe Waldnutzung im östlichen Afghanistan. Afghanische Studien,
Band 2. Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain.
The Frontier Post. 1992. 'NWFP PA body to probe smuggling of timber' .
December 16, 1992.
FSMP. 1992. Forestry Sector Master Plan: Executive Summary. Prepared by
UNDP and the Asian Development Bank in collaboration with Ministry of
Food, Agriculture and Cooperatives, December 1992.
24
Guha, Ramachandra. 1989. The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and
Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Hamilton, Lawrence S. 1988. 'Semantics, definitions and deforestation'. IUCN
Special Report Bulletin, 18(4-6):8-9.
-. 1992. 'The protective role of mountain forests'. Geojournal, 27(1): 13-22.
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. 'The tragedy of the commons'. Science, 162:1243-1248.
HJP. 1993a. 'Forest management planning'. Islamabad: Himalayan Jungle
Project (mimeo).
-. 1993b. 'Forestry and conservation in the Palas valley' (Biodiversity
importance of Palas). Islamabad: Himalayan Jungle Project (mimeo).
-. n.d. 'Natural resource management (Annex 3)'. Islamabad. Himalayan
Jungle Project (mimeo).
Ilyas, Mohammad.1992. 'The root cause'. Herald, (October), pp. 35-36.
Ismael, Mohammad. 1994. 'Afghan forestry' . In: Asian Study Group. The
Destruction of the Forests and Wooden Architecture of Eastern Afghanistan
and Northern Pakistan: Nuristan to Baltistan. Islamabad: Asian Study
Group, pp. 16-22.
IUCN. 1993. The Way Ahead: IUCN's Programme in Pakistan for the Triennium
1994-96. Karachi: The World Conservation Union.
Jan, Abeed Ulla. 1990. A Case Study of Forest Harvesting Systems in Mountain
Forests of Pakistan. Islamabad.
-. 1993. Forest Policy: Administration and Management in Pakistan.
Islamabad: Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development and
GOP-USAID Forestry Planning and Development Project.
Jungle. 1993. 'Forest and wooden architecture: The trail of destruction from
Nooristan to Baltistan'. Jungle - Forestry Extension Network Newsletter,
1(2).
Khan, Amir, D. A. Garner, and C. M. Conner. 1993. 'Feasibility of GIS as a
regional planning tool for sustainable development: A case study of KUlram
and Orakzai Agencies of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FAT A)' .
Pakistan Journal of Geography, III(June-December):1-18.
Khattak, Ghaus M. 1976a. 'History of forest management (I)'. The Pakistan
Journal of Forestry, April: 105-116.
-. 1976b. 'History of forest management in Pakistan (Il): Temperate and
coniferous forests'. The Pakistan Journal of Forestry, July: 163-170.
-. 1994. 'Strategy for sustainable development of forestry in NWFP'.
Peshawar: IUCN-SPCS (Draft), 42 pages.
KIDP. 1988. 'Background information on Kalam Tehsil, Malakand Division,
NWFP, Pakistan'. Kalam and Zürich: Geographisches Institut, Universität
Zürich and Kalam Integrated Development Project (Unpublished report).
Knudsen, Are 1. 1995. 'Forestry management in Pakistan: Failed policies or
local mismanagement?' Bergen: Report to the Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs's 'North-South Research Programme'.
25
Knudsen, Are 1. forthcoming. Property rights, accessibility and
entrepreneurship: Patterns of deforestation in District Kohistan, (NWFP,
Pakistan). CMI Working Paper Series (1997).
Masud-ul-Mulk. 1994. 'Managing forests in Chitral'. In: Asian Study Group.
The Destruction of the Forests and Wooden Architecture of Eastern
Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan: Nuristan to Baltistan. Islamabad: Asian
Study Group, pp. 51-55.
McCay, Bonnie J. and James M. Acheson (eds.). 1987. The Question of the
Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. Tucson,
Arizona: The University of Arizona Press.
McKean, Margareth and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. 'Common property regimes in
the forest: Just a relic from the past?'. Unasylva, 46(180):3- 14.
Minissale, Gregory. 1991. 'Plunder in the Hils'. Herald, (February), pp. 81-86.
Mumtaz, Khawar. 1989. 'Pakistan's environment: A historical perspective'. In:
K. Mumtaz and Abidi-Habib (eds.). Pakistan's Environment: A Historical
Perspective and Selected Bibliography with Annotations. Karachi: JRC and
IUCN.
Nasar, Anita D. 1995. 'Into the woodwork'. The Way Ahead - Pakistan's
Environment and Development Quarterly, (September), pp. 6-7.
NCS. 1992. The Pakistan National ConservationStrategy. Karachi: Government
of Pakistan, Environment and Urban Division in Collaboration with the
IUCN - The World Conservation Union.
The News. 1992. 'Tribals clash over ownership to forest. December 14, 1992
1992. 'Heated debate in NWFP PA on fore st co-operatives,
deforestation'. December 16, 1992.
-. 1994. 'Kaghan valley rises to fight ilegal logging'. November 1, 1994.
Nuristani, Yusuf. 1994. Traditional use of Nuristani forests. In: Asian Study
Group. The Destruction of the Forests and Wooden Architecture of Eastern
Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan: Nuristan to Baltistan. Islamabad: Asian
Study Group, pp. 25-31.
PFI. 1992. Forestry Statistics of Pakistan. Peshawar: Pakistan Forest Institute.
Prime Minister's Directive. 1993. 'Action plan regarding management and
malpractices in Forest Cooperative Societies in Hazara Division and forests
in general in Pakistan'. September 30, 1993.
Rathjens, CarL. 1974. 'Die Wälder von Nuristan and Paktia: Standort-
bedingungen und Nutzung der ostafghanischen Waldgebiete'. Geographische
Zeitschrift, 62:295-311.
Schickhoff, Udo. 1993a. 'Interrelations between ecological and socio-economic
change: The case of the high altitude forests in the Northern Areas of
Pakistan'. Pakistan Journal of Geography, III(June):59-70.
1993b. Das Kaghan-Tal im Westhimalaya (Pakistan). Bonner
Geographische Abhandlungen. Bonn: F. Dümmlers Verlag.
-. 1995a. 'Himalayan forest-cover changes in historical perspective: A case
study from the Kaghan valley, Northern Pakistan'. Mountain Research and
Development, 15(1):3-18.
26
-. 1995b. 'Verbreitung, Nutzung und Zerstörung der Höhenwälder im
Karakorum und in angrenzenden Hochgebirgsräumen Nordpakistans'.
Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen, 139(2):67-85.
SDPI. 1995. Nature, Power, People: Citizens' Report on Sustainable
Development, 1995. Islamabad: Sustainable Deve10pment Policy Institute.
SPCS. 1993. Sarhad Provincial Conservation Strategy. Peshawar: GOP, Swiss
Development Cooperation and IUCN.
SUNGI. 1995. Vanishing Shadows ('Mit-thay Huay Sayey'). Abbottabad: Video
film produced with support of Friedrich Naumann Foundation.
Swati, Muhammad K. and Muhammad A. Cheema. 1991. 'Outturn volume of
Chir pine in Guzara forests of District Mansehra'. The Pakistan Journal of
Forestry, 41(2):94-101.
Treacy, Mark. 1994. 'The timber harvesting ban and its implications: Points for
discussion'. In: Asian Study Group. The Destruction of the Forests and
Wooden Architecture of Eastern Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan:
Nuristan to Baltistan. Islamabad: Asian Study Group, pp. 3- 10.
Tucker, Richard P. 1982. 'The forests of the Western Himalayas: The legacy
of British Colonial Administration' . Journal of Forest History, (July): 1 12-
123.
-. 1984. 'The historical context of social forestry in the Kumaon Himalayas'.
Journal of Developing Areas, 18(3):341-35.
-. 1987. 'Dimensions of deforestation in the Himalayas: The historical
setting'. Mountain Research and Development, 7(3):328-331.
-. 1988. 'The British Empire and India's forest resources: The timberlands
of Assam and Kumaon, 1914-1950'. In: J. F. Richards and R. P. Tucker
(eds.). World Deforestation in the Twentieth Century. Durham: Duke
University Press, pp. 91-111.
Usui, Shunji. 1994. 'Opportunities for conservation and development through
evaluation of forests: A case study in Western Himalayas'. Unpublished
MSc. thesis. Edinburgh: Scottish Agricultural College.
Yusufzai, Rahimullah. 1992. 'The timber mafia'. Newsline, 4(5):126-130.
27

Recent W orking Papers
WP 1995: 3
WP 1995: 4
WP 1995: 5
WP 1996: 1
WP 1996: 2
WP 1996: 3
WP 1996:4
WP 1996: 5
WP 1996: 6
WP 1996: 7
WP 1996: 8
WP 1996: 9
WP 1996: 10
ANGELSEN, Arild and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad
Land reforms and land degradation in Tanzania: Alternative economic
approaches. Bergen, July 1995,38 pp.
FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Taxation and tax reforms in Tanzania: A survey. Bergen, November 1995, 35 pp.
FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Valued-added taxation in Tanzania? Bergen, November 1995, 27 pp.
STOKKE, HUGO
Institutional approaches to the study of international organisation. Bergen,
February 1996, 23 pp.
TJOMSLAND, Marit
A discussion of three theoretical approaches to modernity: Understanding
modernity as aglobalising phenomenon. Bergen, July 1996,24 pp.
KNUDSEN, Are J. and Kate HALVORSEN
Income-generating programmes in Pakistan and Malawi: A comparative review.
Bergen, August 1996.
FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Bistand og næringsutvikling. Noen kommentarer til St. meld. nr. 19 (1995-96).
Bergen, august 1996, 17 s.
RAKNER, Lise and Tor SKÂLNES
Political institutions and economic reform: Zambia and South Africa in
comparative context. Bergen, September 1996, 44 pp.
RAKNER, Lise
Rational choice and the problem of institutions. A discussion of rational choice
institutionalism and its application by Robert Bates. Bergen, September 1996, 31
pp.
ARIFIN, Bustanul
Economic analysis of land degradation in Indonesian upland. Bergen,
September 1996,20 pp.
PAUSEWANG, Siegfried
"Eneweyay" (Lets Discuss). Bergen, September 1996.
ANGELSEN, Arild
Deforestation: Population or market driven? Diferent approaches in modelling
agricultural expansion. Bergen, September 1996,30 pp.
ANGELSEN, Arild and Richard CULAS
Debt and deforestation: A tenuous link. Bergen, September 1996, 29 pp.
